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lthough at far from the level of intensity and prominence
that it reached 10 years ago, the controversy over hate
crimes legislation continues. In the early 1990s, debate
centered on two main points of contention: whether such laws,
which either criminalized traditionally racist acts or increased
the punishment for other crimes when they were motivated by
racial or ethnic bias, violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of expression, and whether the laws were unwise and
illegitimate because they seemed to provide greater protection
against crime to minority groups and to emphasize, rather than
obscure or obliterate, the racial divisions in our society.
The United States Supreme Court gave mixed answers to
the former question, first striking down a municipal ordinance
that banned cross burning as an unconstitutional content- and
viewpoint-based restriction in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,505
U.S. 377 (1992), and later upholding against First Amendment
challenge a state law that enhanced the penalties for crimes
motivated by bias in Wisconsin v.Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476
(1993). In reconciling its decisions, the Court in Mitchell drew
a line between expression and criminal conduct "unprotected
by the First Amendment,' and, citing that distinction, most
state courts faced with the issue have likewise affirmed the
constitutionality of their penalty enhancement statutes. First
Amendment questions linger, however, as the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to consider the decision of the
Supreme Court of Virginia striking down that state's crossburning statute. (Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va.
2001), cert. grantedsub nora. Virginia v.Black, __ S. Ct. __,
70 USLW 3719 (May 28, 2002).) Likewise, the latter set of
questions remains open for debate, even as existing legislation
continues to be enforced and new legislation is proposed. As
the United States Congress takes up the perennial controversy
over whether federal civil rights legislation should be expanded
to reach crimes motivated by sexual orientation or gender, and
as anti-Arab violence has become a matter of grave concern in
the wake of 9/11, these fundamental questions warrant continued discussion and reflection.
While courts and politicians wrestle with these issues at a
more abstract level, prosecutors and defense lawyers handling
individual cases must contend with questions that implicate the
same concerns and are no less important to the larger debate
about the legitimacy and wisdom of treating hate crimes differently. Decisions made at the level of individual cases-from
the decision whether to treat a case as a hate crime for purposes
of investigation and prosecution to questions of trial strategy,
such as how to tell the story of the crime or to portray the defendant and victim-have a wide impact, because those decisions influence both society's perception of what a hate crime
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"is" and our broader understanding of the fundamental social
problem underlying the phenomenon of hate crime.
These case-specific decisions, though more particularized
and practical, are often based on the same assumptions and value judgments that are more prominently aired in the wider debate. In this article, I suggest that uncritical acceptance of these
assumptions presents a significant and far from theoretical
problem in the prosecution and defense of hate crimes, for the
assumptions paint a distorted and overly narrow picture of such
crimes that can lead prosecutors to overlook cases that warrant
penalty enhancement, promote the use of unproductive, socially harmful, and potentially unconstitutional trial strategies, and
invite acquittals on illegitimate grounds.

Overview of hate crimes laws
A range of laws, some over a century old, can be used to
prosecute hate crimes. (For a comprehensive discussion of the
federal and state statutes, see Lu-IN WANG, HATE CRMES LAW
(WestGroup 1994, updated through 2000).) The federal government, as well as some states, prosecutes hate crime primarily under civil rights statutes, an approach that dates back to the
post-Civil War Reconstruction Era. The six major federal criminal statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242, 245, 247, and 248, and
42 U.S.C. § 3631, and several states have enacted civil rights
legislation following the federal model. The key element under
civil rights laws is that the defendant intended to intimidate the
victim in or to interfere with the free exercise of rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or the particular
state; these statutes may or may not also require that the defendant acted because of the victim's race or other protected status.
Other statutes, such as the Virginia statute before the
Supreme Court, prohibit acts that historically have been associated with racial, religious, and ethnic hostility and that typically
are intended to induce or have the effect of inducing fears of
persecution, particularly (though not exclusively) in members
of minority groups. These practices traditionally have been employed by white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan
and include cross burning, mask and hood wearing, and defacing churches, synagogues, and other institutional property, such
as monuments, memorials, or cemeteries, that is associated
with or significant to particular groups.
Penalty enhancement legislation, the newest and most controversial approach, applies most broadly and is likely to be
used in hate crime cases involving harassment, intimidation, or
assault. This approach has been adopted by more than half of
the states. (It also can apply to federal crimes through section
3A1. l(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.) Following model "intimidation" legislation drafted by the AntiDefamation League of B'nai B'rith in 1981, the core concept of
these laws is to punish an already-defined crime more heavily
where commission of that crime was motivated by bias based
on race, religion, national origin, or other specified characteristics of the victim or another person. Accordingly, most state

statutes read similarly to the model statute, which provides: "A
person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the
actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of individuals, he
violates [a particular section ofl the Penal Code." (ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRImEs LAws: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 2 (1994).) The greatest variation among state statutes is
in the particular crimes and protected groups they enumerate.
The latter feature has engendered some of the most acrimonious debates within state legislatures; although inclusion of
race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion have not been controversial, a number of state legislatures have reached an impasse on the questions of whether to include gender and sexual
orientation.

Three key assumptions about hate crimes
A controversy that today seldom makes its way into the
publicized debates-possibly because supporters and opponents of bias crime legislation frequently share a common understanding of the crime, if not a common view of what to do
about it-is the question of what constitutes a hate or bias
crime. This question is exceedingly important, for it defines our
perception of the social problem represented by hate crime.
This conception, in turn, influences thinking on all of the "big"
issues, including how we identify the law and policy issues the
problem raises and define the terms in which those issues
should be debated. Yet this question often falls to law enforcement, the prosecution, and the defense to dispute and determine, for it is implicated in decisions concerning how cases are
prosecuted and defended, albeit often in ways that are not noiced because the question is subsuned into matters of trial
strategy and choice of narrative.
The shared, conventional understanding of hate crime reflects the influence of the "prototype" for such cases. Based
upon features of some of the most dramatic and well-publicized cases, such as the brutal killings of Vincent Chin, James
Byrd, Jr., and Matthew Shepard, the prototypical hate crime
case comprises the following features:
[The perpetrator and victim are strangers. The perpetrator selects the victim not because of any personal hostility between
them or because the victim's own conduct has provoked an attack, but solely because the perpetrator sees the individual victim as a "fungible" or an "interchangeable" representative of a
racial or social group that the perpetrator hates. The perpetrator
commonly utters derogatory group-based epithets before, during, or after the crime, but whether or not he verbally demonstrates his hostility, the criminal act itself is typically characterized by extreme, gratuitous violence or the destruction of property. The personal injury or property damage inflicted, as well
as the fear that his acts create, appear to be the perpetrator's
main objectives, for, in prototypical cases, nothing of value is
taken. While one-on-one and group-on-group crimes could fit

the pattern, the prototypical crime more commonly is committed by multiple perpetrators on a single victim.
(Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIo ST.
L.J. 799, 802-03 (1999) (footnotes omitted).)
Consistent with this central image, three major assumptions
are evident at all levels of discussion of hate crime, from high
profile legal and political debates to day-to-day decision making in individual cases. In all of these contexts, moreover, the
assumptions are shared by both of the opposing sides. The three
assumptions are interrelated, but can be itemized as follows:
• Perpetrators act to further their personal hostility toward
the victim's social group. They are motivated by their own negative opinions or attitudes toward the targeted social group,
rather than by the opinions or attitudes of others.
• Perpetrators are freaks or lunatics at the fringe of society.
Their biases are deviant and irrational; their feelings toward the
target group are not shared by members of mainstream society,
nor do their actions make logical sense.
- The perpetrators' biases are so irrational that they are driven to commit crimes for no other reason than to inflict harm
on a member of the target group, and not for some other, more
easily understandable reason, such as a desire to obtain personal gain.
(For more extensive discussion of these assumptions, see id.
at 8 15-30.)
Proponents and critics of bias crime legislation rely on these
assumptions in arguing the legitimacy, efficacy, and constitutionality of the laws. The arguments of critics more patently incorporate the assumptions, given their close connection with
the First Amendment issues. The assumptions support the idea
that penalty-enhancement laws punish thoughts or beliefs, for
critics contend that, except for being politically unpopular, the
bias that motivates hate crime perpetrators is no different from
any of the constitutionally protected attitudes, feelings, or
philosophies that we all have, and that hate crimes legislation
starts us down the "slippery slope" to outlawing the expression
of all manner of unpopular opinions. (The seminal article raising these concerns is Susan Gellman, Stickv and Stones Can
Put You in Jail,but Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic IntimidationLaws, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 333 (1991).) Critics also invoke the assumptions when they argue that hate crime laws simply won't
"work," for punishment cannot force criminals to change their
views and that, besides, perpetrators are so antisocial and unreasonable that they cannot be chastened or deterred. The assumption that perpetrators are social misfits further supports the view
that the problem of hate crime does not warrant special legislation because true hate crimes are exceedingly rare, being committed by only a "small number of deviant bigots." (JAMEs B.
JACOBS & KIMBERLY

PorrE, HATE CRIMEs: CRIMINAl. LAW &

IDENTITY PoLrrcs 7-8 (1998).)
Supporters, too, rely on the three assumptions, though obvi-
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ously they see their implications quite differently For some
supporters of penalty enhancement, the assumption that perpetrators acted out of personal animus, rather than in response to
external forces or from a desire to obtain some material benefit,
makes them morally worse and more culpable criminals. Moreover, the perpetrator's assumed hostility, deviance, and irrationality are offered as justifications for enhanced punishment,
because crimes motivated by these impulses are believed to inflict greater psychic and social harms on the victim, the victim's
social group, and the community at large. The assumptions also
support the view that bias crime legislation is needed to send
the message that society condemns the perpetrator's bigotry
and hatred. (For the major arguments in support of bias crimes
legislation, see FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE:
BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999).)

In addition to influencing the political debate, the three assumptions work their way into law enforcement officials' and
attorneys' decision-making and trial strategy. At the initial
stages, law enforcement professionals must determine which
cases qualify for treatment as bias crimes. Typically, officers
apply a very narrow definition, whether based on their own assumptions or direct guidance or perceived pressure from the
prosecutor's office to pursue only
those cases that seem clearly
"winnable." They tend to pursue
only paradigmatic or prototypical
cases involving extreme brutality
or sensational facts, while excluding cases that are less dramatic or
involve mixed motives. For example, a case in which the defendant
uttered racist epithets while committing a robbery may not be investigated as a hate crime because
the defendant does not appear to
have been motivated by racial animus alone. (For further discussion and examples, see Wang, The Complexities (?f "Hate,"
supra,at 814-15 and 825-29.)
The bias motive is especially likely to be overlooked when
the defendant seems to have been acting in a calculating or "rational" manner by selecting the victim from a particular group.
The view that a "true" bias crime perpetrator acts for no other
reason than to further his or her own irrational hatred of the target group may exclude what appear to be crimes of"discriminatory selection," in which a member of a particular group is
targeted for robbery not because of the perpetrator's hostility toward the victim's group but because that group is viewed as
"easier" to rob because of some perceived vulnerability. (For
further elaboration of the "discriminatory selection" model, as
contrasted with the "racial animus" model of bias crime, see
LAWRENCE, supra, at 29-39; Wang, The Complexities of
"Hate," supra,at 808-15.) The Second Circuit alluded to this
assumption in a footnote in its recent opinion in UnitedStates v.

Nelson, 277 E3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002). In discussing the bias element in 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), a civil rights statute, the
court stated, "Not all attacks 'because' a victim is black are,
however, racially motivated in the relevant sense. Thus a racially indifferent attacker (one who gets his kicks from assaulting
victims regardless of race) might nonetheless pursue exclusively black victims in the belief that the police will be less likely to
seek out or prosecute those who commit violent acts against
blacks." (Id.at 188, n.21. But cf People v McCall,2001 Cal.
App. LEXIS 1879, *10-* 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (unpublished
decision; text in LEXIS) (pointing out that a range of motivations might lead a defendant to discriminate in the selection of
a victim and that "hatred or animus may or may not be a component and is not an essential element of the offense"). It
should be noted that a small number of state bias crime statutes
do explicitly include "animus" as an element of the offense, see
WANG, HATE CRMES LAWS, supra,at 10-23, n.5. However, as
is illustrated by research into the motivations for even "prototypical" hate crimes, discussed below, that term need not be understood so narrowly as to encompass only the defendant's personal feelings.) Similarly, robberies targeting Asian immigrants
or gay men often are not considered bias crimes when the defendant is understood as having
selected the victim because
members of those groups are
viewed as both likely to have a
lot of cash on hand and unlikely
to report the crime to police or to
n a rrow
obtain assistance from them.
ionr to
At trial, prosecution and defense strategies often reflect the
three assumptions as well. For
ime S.
example, in accordance with the
assumption that the defendant
acted out of his or her personal
hatred of the targeted group, prosecutors often try to portray the
perpetrator as someone who does not "like" persons of the victim's group. In their book criticizing bias crime legislation,
James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter derided one such attempt,
in which the white, male defendant fought a charge of ethnic
intimidation by taking the stand "to proclaim that he was not
racist." On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to rebut
this claim by revealing, inter alia, that the defendant did not
know the first namne of, had never gone out to dinner with, had
never had a beer with, had never gone to a movie with, and had
never invited to a picnic or the creek his neighbor, a 65-year-old
black woman. The prosecutor also asked the defendant to name
"one [black] person, just one who was a really good friend of
[his]." (JACOBS & POrrER, supra,at 106-07.)
On a more troubling level, the assumption that the defendant
acts to further his or her hostility against the targeted group also
invites the prosecution to present evidence that raises serious
First Amendment concerns. The most common evidence of
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bias motive is the defendant's own words, for in many cases
perpetrators utter racial or other derogatory, group-based slurs
before., during, or after the crime. The Supreme Court has stated that the First Amendment is not violated when a defendant's
speech is used to prove the elements of a crime or to establish
motive or intent. (See Wisconsin v.Mitchell, 508 U.S. at
489-90.) However, prosecutors have not stopped at evidence of
the defendant's statements made in direct connection with the
crime charged. It has become increasingly common for the
prosecution to introduce evidence of defendants' general racist
philosophies or interest in racist organizations and even of defendants' possession of racist tattoos, clothing, and literature.
Although courts have warned that such evidence may be used
only when a tight nexus exists between the proffered evidence
and the offense charged, this practice skirts dangerously close
to punishing the defendant for holding, or even exploring, unpopular views. (For a critic's view of the dangers inherent in
such an approach, see Gellman, Sticks andStones, supra, at
358-62.)
Defense attorneys also play upon the three assumptions.
When the investigation and charging process have failed to
weed out such a case, see discussion supra,one defense strategy is to portray the crime as one of logic or calculation, rather
than group-based hostility. Thus, the defense might argue that
the defendant targeted the gay victim for robbery not because
the defendant hates gays, but because gay men make "easy targets": They are expected to carry a lot of cash and to be reluctant to report crimes against
them for fear of "outing" themselves to police and others.
This strategy can be very effective, because it presents the defendant's actions as being logiu
cal and understandable: He or
she was acting merely as one
would expect a rational criminal
to act, and not as a hate-crazed
(i.e., "real") bias crime perpetrator.
Similarly, playing off of the assumption that "real" hate
crime perpetrators are social deviants, another approach is to
emphasize the "averageness" of the defendant. In cases involving antigay violence, for example, a common defense strategy
is to portray the defendant as a person whose "actions are neither serious nor unusual," and to present evidence of the defendant's "'good family background,' exemplary behavior in
school, and participation in organized athletics'" (GARY DAv[D
COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 82, 92
(1990).)
Finally, another defense strategy designed to make the defendant's actions appear understandable, and even acceptable,
is to exploit invidious stereotypes of the victim's group. The
defense might, for example, try to justify the defendant's violence against a gay victim by arguing that the victim made sex-

ual overtures to the defendant or was otherwise behaving inappropriately. (It is interesting to note the similarity between this
line of defense and the common practice during this country's
"lynching era" of inciting white mobs to racial violence by alleging-most often falsely-that the black, male victim had
raped, terrorized, or insulted a white woman or girl. See STEwART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930, at 46-49
(1995).)

The three assumptions debunked
Not only do the conventional assumptions invite silly, distasteful, socially harmful, and potentially unconstitutional trial
strategies, they also do damage on a larger scale because they
distort our general understanding of hate crimes--even, it turns
out, of prototypical hate crimes. In doing so, they enable us to
overlook the ways in which the social environment contributes
to the continuing vulnerability of certain groups, by marking
them as "suitable victims" of such crimes and enabling perpetrators to use violence against them to obtain a variety of goals,
including mundane objectives common to the most petty of
crimes.
Many cases of hate crime, even those that conform most
closely to the prototype, do not conform to the three assumptions. In an earlier article, I examined social scientists' research
into the motivations for two crimes that match, feature by feature, the prototype for hate
crime: antiblack violence during this country's infamous
lynching era (the years between
1880-1930) and contemporary

Conye ntion a I
ass
ption s invite
I

antigay violence. (See Wang,
The Complexities of "Hate,"
~ supra.)What that research
shows is that, far from being
deviant, irrational acts driven by
the perpetrators' personal hostility toward the victim's group, such crimes often are "rational"
and opportunistic, as perpetrators seek to obtain psychological,
social, and even material rewards by exploiting a societal view
that members of the target group are "suitable" or acceptable
targets for violence.
In turn, the perpetration of hate crimes continues the social
and cultural "feedback loop" that perpetuates and reinforces the
suitable victim designation. Social scientists have explained
that bias-motivated violence against particular groups creates
the conditions for prejudice and discrimination because it defines the "safe" or "expected" targets for violence and other
forms of ill treatment. Observers recognize the pattern that such
violence follows, and the social context surrounding those acts
makes them "possible and even acceptable." (IRis MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLmCS OF DIFFERENCE 61 (1990);
see also Andrew E. Taslit7, Condemning the RacistPersonali-

silly trial Etrateg ies.

8
CRIMINAL JUSTICE a Fall 2002

-

j.

rom Charles C Thomas, Publisher!

P.ayne, Brian K.-INCARCERATING THITE4TOLLAR OFFENDERS: The Prison Experience and
Beyond. '02, 202 pp, (7 x i0), 12 it., 20 tables,
*HolmesV
Warren D. -CRIMINAL INTERROGATION: A Modern Format for Interrogating
Criminal Suspects Based on the Intellectual
Approach. '02, 166 pp, (7 x 10). $38.95. hard,
$24.95, paper.
• Siljander, Raymond P. & Darin D. Fredrickson
FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE: A Guide for Uniformed and Plainclothes
Personnel. (2nd Ed,) '02. 434 pp (7 x 10), 160 it., 2
tables,
, Flowers, R. Bard- MURDER, AT THE END OF
THE DAY AND NIGHT: A Study of Criminal
Homicide Offenders, Victims, and Circumstances.
'02, 262 pp. (7 x 10). 35 ii., 38 tables, $53.95. hard.
$36.95, paper..
'Kelly, Jan Seaman -FORENSIC EXAMINATION
OF RUBBER STAMPS: A Practical Guide. '02,
242 pp. (8 1/2 x 11), 345 il., $55.95, hard, $36.95,
paper.

THE POLICE OFFICER'S
GUIDE TO OPERATING AND
SURVIVING IN LOW-LIGHT
AND NO-LIGHT CONDITIONS

How to Prevail in strresful Sitoations Through
Proper tvsi,ov Main-g aid lnstrtuciosi on eliUse
,ad Availabiiity of Illusnimmaion Tools
To be pt*Rafl,2510,A42pag
tf1051 bard ISBN8_Ml4t,
$)6.95, papar
[SAN0-11904?14

'

,~J

~,, I

DEFENSIBLE POLICIES
Developing, Writing, and

fmplenenting Valid Policies tor

Problem Oriented Policing

Pub lied 2001, 156 Pao$
Stunnd I. Bet & ilame. OIr
$24.9, "p e ISBNll 0 +-984I71)9x[il~ ayed)
....................
S37.95,
d~h IBN 0-M-071l8t1-8

"O'Reilly, James T.-POLICE TRAFFIC STOPS
AND RACIAL PROFILING: Resolving Management, Labor and Civil Rights Conflicts. '02, 304 pp.
(7 x 10), $59.95, hard, $41.95, paper.
"Hibbard, Whitney S., Raymond W Worring & Richard
Brennan-PSYCHIC CRIMINOLOGY: A Guide
For Using Psychics In Investigations. (2nd Ed.) '02,
164 pp. (7 x 10), $36.95, hard, $23,95, paper.
"Fredrickson, Darin D. & Raymond . Si ljanderRACIAL PROFILING: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Racial and Criminal Profiling and
Clarifying What Constitutes Unfair Discrimination
and Persecution. '02., 170 pp, (7 x 10), $39,95, hard,
$24.95, paper.
" Hackett, Dell R & John M. Vioianti-POLICE SUICIDE: Tactics for Prevention. '02, 140 pp, (7 x 10),
4i.
*Campbell, Andrea & Ralph C. Ohm-LEGAL EASE:
A Guide to Criminal Law, Evidence, and
Procedure '02, 316 pp. (7 x 10), 31 il, $61,95, hard,
$42.95, paper
• Williams, Howard E.-ASSET FORFEITURE: A
Law Enforcement Perspective. '02, 332 pp. (7 x 10),
$63.95, hard, $44.95, paper

THE POLICE OFFICER
IN THE COURTROOM
+++,+ ++ +++

How to Avoid the Pitfalls of Cros-EaNoination
Through the Proper Preparation and
Presentation of Investigative Reports. it-Court
'lctintony, and Evidence

PuWblslii 2001, 206 pajes
Do" 1ewl
$51",Iar ISDN 0)113012124
$)5.95, paper ISBN 0-39-0213-2

THE SOURCES OF VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT
4 7.95, Ciao ISBN 0 -49=
11"T
$19.95, pape
ISBNl
lifisplayeatr
C, lwi.hl Xeyf,
Gr &
ra,8-r1*
&171l+!
Lata A411
41111M;,

... . ..

ty: Why the Criticsof Hate CriinesLegislationAre Wrong, 40
B.C. L. REv. 739, 758-65 (1999) (discussing ways in which
hate crimes contribute to a racist culture and raise the risk of
similar future harms); Lu-in Wang, The TransformingPower of
"Hate":Social Cognition Theory andthe Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL.L. REv. 47 (1997) (discussing psychological and social effects of hate crimes).)
For example, a series of highly regarded, sophisticated,
quantitative studies of historical data from the lynching era
shows that racial violence often was used in the cotton-growing
areas of the South as an instrument for maintaining white control over land and labor in the years following Emancipation,
when African Americans gained a measure of freedom and
economic progress, white landowners and laborers lost both
their property rights in slaves and their complete control over
land, and the cotton market weakened. (These studies are collected in TOLNAY & BECK, supra;they also are discussed in
Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra,at 832-67.) The
studies show that, not only were perpetrators primarily focused
on the economic benefits that might be derived from racial violence, but they also controlled their use of it as suited their interests, escalating the violence when and where it would help
them control land and labor, but moderating or even abandoning
it when and where it was either not necessary or even harmful to
those interests.
By no means do the researchers contend that lynching had
nothing to do with racial prejudice; indeed, a racially hostile
climate was important to the ability of perpetrators to reap
gains from violence against blacks. However, what they do
point out is that an individual perpetrator did not need to hate
blacks in order to have a reason to lynch: "Given the Deep
South's racial caste structure, whites could harass and assault
blacks with virtual impunity. Blacks were considered legitimate, and even deserving, objects for white wrath." (E.M. Beck
& Stewart E. Tolnay, The Killing Fields of the Deep South: The
Marketfor Cotton and the Lynching ofBlackv, 1882-1930,55
AM. Soc. REv. 526, 537 (1990).) In other words, perpetrators
could count on obtaining benefits from racial violence because
blacks had been socially identified as "suitable targets" for such
violence. Contrary to the assumption that hostility can be separated from more self-interested reasons for targeting a particular group, these researchers show that animus and opportunism
can be bound together by a perpetrator's willingness to exploit
the social vulnerabilities of that group.
Opportunistic targeting is no less a factor in contemporary
hate crimes. In particular, antigay violence often is driven not
so much by the perpetrators' own hostility toward gay men and
lesbians as by the rewards it can bring-rewards of psychological, social, and even material value. Some perpetrators (especially young males) corrunit "gay bashing" in groups and view
it as a kind of "sport." Some young men who have participated
in this activity have explained that they did so not out of hostility toward gays but because it was exciting, it drew them closer

to other members of the group, and it brought the group the respect and recognition of their peers. These young men exploit
the idea that gay men are "suitable" targets for such violencea view that is reinforced when their peers laud them and authority figures (including parents, teachers, law enforcement officers, and judges) dismiss their antics as "boys being boys.'
More explicitly calculating perpetrators target gay men for
property crimes, including robbery, blackmail, and the "shakedown," crimes in which the perpetrator uses threats, violence,
and often the possibility of "outing" the victim in order to extract money or other property from him. These perpetrators
have explained that they, too, take advantage of society's disregard for gay men, for they count on the victims to comply out of
fear of having their sexual orientation revealed and on police,
judges, and juries to minimize or overlook crimes against gays.
(For a particularly chilling look into the thought processes behind such crimes, see LICENSED TO KRL (Arthur Dong/DeepFocus Productions 1997), a documentary film containing interviews with convicted killers of gay men.)

Conclusion
As the Court of Appeal of California has stated, the term
"hate crime" is "actually a misnomer," because "bias offenders
will often commit the crimes for excitement or to achieve feelings of domination or superiority and target victims they perceive as weak or vulnerable; hatred or animus may or may not
be a component[.]" (McCall,2001 Cal. App. LEXIS at *11.)
Certainly it is important for courts to recognize that the forces
that propel hate crimes are more complicated than the one dimensional, conventional view suggests. However, as the actors
who determine more directly how a particular case is conceived
and plays out in court, prosecutors and defense attorneys also
must incorporate a broader and more nuanced understanding of
bias crimes into their handling of individual cases.
Certainly prosecutors, who make charging decisions and
thereby both determine how a case is labeled for trial and,
through that power, influence how law enforcement officers
proceed at the earlier stages of investigation, should be aware of
the complex motivations that contribute to bias crimes and be
less quick to exclude from consideration cases in which the defendant appears to have been acting from motivations in addition to or other than "pure" animus. This broader understanding
ought also to encourage prosecutors to present a more contextually anchored view of the case at trial. For example, the prosecution might examine the circumstances surrounding the crime
to show how, in that situation, defendants could gain psychological, social, or material rewards from targeting a member of the
victim's social group, whether through the reactions they calculated their crime would evoke or, conversely, the ease with
which they thought they would "get away with it." In other
words, the prosecution should seek to avoid the fruitless spectacle of badgering defendants about who their friends are, as well
as the more dangerous prospect of convicting defendants be-
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cause of the ideas they have explored, by trying instead to
show that the defendants sought, through their crime, to exploit
a social context in which particular groups have been marked
as expected or suitable targets for violence.
By more fully elaborating the ways in which the defendant's crime played upon the social vulnerability of the targeted group, the prosecution may be able to head off or combat a
defense attempt to justify the defendant's actions by exploiting
malicious stereotypes of the victim's group. Defense attorneys
themselves should be reminded that, although they owe a duty
to their clients to mount a vigorous defense, they also have an
ethical responsibility to refrain from tactics that play upon
group-based stereotypes and further contribute to the social environment that makes hate crimes "possible and even acceptable" (YOUNG, supra.See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDuct Rule 8.4(d) and cmt. [2] (stating, in part, "A lawyer

who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice.").)
Legal advocates on both sides of a hate crime case should recognize the role their advocacy plays within the larger public dialogue concerning such crimes. Rather than being (mis)guided by
unquestioning acceptance of the three conventional assumptions,
that dialogue should recognize the converse social realities: "that
the perpetrators' bias is socially reinforced, and not simply personal; that the perpetrators' acts are iot uncommon and often are
rational; and that perpetrators often are able to obtain-and frequently are motivated at least in part by the desire to obtain-material rewards or other personal benefits." (Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra,at 817 (emphasis in original).) E
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